I. INTRODUCTION
There is no denying that drug abuse and addiction have plagued our nation's criminal justice system. 1 Drugs have not only destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, but have also propagated a host of offenses across the criminal spectrum.
2 Today, an enormous share of inmates across the country report histories of drug use. 3 Kansas inmates are no exception. 4 The Kansas Sentencing Commission reported that Kansans committed more drug crimes 5 in 2012 than any other offense. 5. "Drug crime" refers to those crimes involving controlled substances, for example, "unlawful possession of a controlled substance," "unlawful manufacturing of a controlled Of the over 13,000 offenders sentenced across the state in 2012, roughly 30% of those offenders were sentenced for drug offenses. 7 Indeed, the gravity of this problem is so understood that further acknowledgement seems to only harden our collective sentiment that the problem is incurable.
Thus, courts across the country have struggled to determine how best to deal with this problematic and ever-increasing population of offenders. While incarceration has been the traditional curative nationwide, prison sentences have not had the intended deterrent effect on drug offenders 8 and drug-involved offenders. 9 In fact, offenders struggling with drug addiction have such an extreme rate of recidivism that the problem has been likened to a "revolving door." 10 Many jurisdictions have come to realize that simply locking up drug-involved offenders is ineffective. 7. Id. 8. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "drug offender" refers to the offender convicted of a drug crime, for example illegal possession, manufacturing, distribution, etc. The term "drug-involved offender" (or "substance-involved offender") is broader and refers to any criminal offender who abuses drugs.
9. See JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 30-31 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that former Drug Czar in the Clinton Administration, Barry McCaffrey, has even acknowledge that "we have a failed social policy and it has to be re-evaluated. Otherwise, we're going to bankrupt ourselves. Because we can't incarcerate our way out of this problem.").
10. State v. Preston, 195 P.3d 240, 244 (Kan. 2008) (referring to a February 12, 2003 memorandum from Kansas Sentencing Commission to the Senate Judiciary Committee); see also NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 1, at 5 ("Substance-involved offenders are likelier to recidivate than those who are not substance involved. Over half (52.2 percent) of substance-involved inmates have one or more previous incarcerations compared with 31.2 percent of inmates who are not substance involved.").
11. It is now widely acknowledged that a war-on-drugs mentality, steeped in deterrence, is an ineffective approach to the problem. Over the last forty years, despite the continued imposition of stiff penalties, the use of illegal drugs has continued across the country. See generally GRAY, supra note 9, at 17-158 (describing the history of drug laws in the United States and how modern drug laws have harmed communities and drug users themselves). This is the reality we are facing. Under our current policy, drugs are everywhere . . . . Our current system is completely unable to keep illicit drugs out of our communities and away from our children. Even Joseph A. Califano, the former Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the chairman of the Columbia University Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse said, 'American children are telling us they are drenched in drugs.' Id. at 50-51. See also NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 1, at 5 ("Breaking the cycle of re-arrest and re-incarceration requires breaking the cycle of addiction.").
The reason for this is simple. Drug addiction, by its very nature, cannot be cured through incarceration. 12 To address this revolving-door problem, many states have turned to drug courts. By combining probation, drug treatment, and continuous judicial supervision, drug courts have proven themselves an enormous success. 13 Indeed, "[m]ore research has been published on drug courts . . . than virtually all other correctional programs combined." 14 Not only have drug courts saved countless dollars, but, more importantly, they have proven themselves extremely effective in breaking the cycle of addiction and recidivism. 15 In response to such favorable results, many states have established drug courts as a long-term solution to crime emanating from drug abuse and addiction. 16 In 2010, the Kansas Supreme Court contacted the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) to "research the feasibility and practicality of instituting state-wide level management over drug courts within the state." 17 The question was whether Kansas should "support and institutionalize, at the state level, the development of traditional drug courts." "institutionalization" as "the process by which individual drug courts evolve from separate experimental entities to a statewide network that is stable, far-reaching, reliably funded and closely monitored." 19 Though a handful of Kansas counties are currently operating drug courts, 20 Kansas has yet to institutionalize drug courts at the state level. 21 The Kansas Legislature, however, has not ignored this revolving-door problem posed by drug-involved offenders. As the NCSC study notes, in 2003 the state legislature passed Senate Bill 123 (SB 123). 22 This law institutionalized mandatory drug treatment under probationary supervision for certain drug-involved offenders.
23
SB 123 is the central focus of this Comment. Specifically, this Comment examines certain provisions of SB 123 and how these provisions relate to drug court practice. When scrutinized, SB 123 has several deficiencies. First, the eligibility and admission requirements of SB 123, which limit the program to a specific class of offenders, undermine the law's effectiveness and hinder its goals. Second, SB 123 lacks the cornerstone of essential drug court practice: continuous judicial supervision. Third, the compulsory nature of SB 123, the law's ability to impose broad and far-reaching sanctions, and its denial of jail-time credit in light of its own strict termination requirements, are not only counterproductive, but also raise constitutional concerns regarding due process. Because of these concerns and deficiencies, SB 123 should be replaced through the state-wide institutionalization of drug courts; and, even if not replaced, SB 123 should not serve as a model if drug courts are institutionalized in Kansas.
II. BACKGROUND
A The Kansas Supreme Court reiterated the goal of SB 123:
[T]he Kansas Sentencing Commission identified the goal of the alternative drug policy (S.B. 123) as: 'to provide community punishment and the opportunity for treatment to nonviolent offenders with drug abuse problems in order to more effectively address the revolving door of drug addicts through the state prisons, which should be reserved for serious, violent offenders.'
25
The law provides probationary supervision and mandatory drug treatment for a select class of drug-involved offenders. 26 Over the past ten years, SB 123 has remained essentially the same, and today is codified in section 21-6824 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated. 27 The eligibility and admission requirements of SB 123 are discussed below, as well as the law's provisions regarding treatment and termination. to prison as provided by this section." 30 This term of imprisonment will not be subject to modification if the offender: (1) previously completed drug treatment or intensive substance abuse treatment; (2) was previously discharged from drug treatment or intensive substance abuse treatment; or (3) previously refused to participate in drug treatment or intensive substance abuse treatment. 31 In short, the offender gets one shot at treatment.
Admission Process
Offenders who meet the eligibility criteria above will be subject to a drug abuse assessment which "shall include a clinical interview with a mental health professional and a recommendation concerning drug abuse treatment for the offender."
32 These offenders will also be subject to a criminal risk-need assessment, which "shall be conducted by a court services officer or a community corrections officer."
33 If the offender is assigned a high-risk status according to the drug abuse assessment, and a moderate-risk or high-risk status according to the criminal risk-need assessment, then the sentencing court shall commit the offender to an SB 123 drug abuse treatment program.
34
In other words, for eligible offenders who meet the assessment qualifications, SB 123 drug treatment is mandatory. Whether the offender actually desires treatment, or instead wishes to serve the underlying sentence, is irrelevant. The sentencing court is required to sentence the offender to SB 123 drug treatment.
Treatment and Supervision
The drug treatment providers must be licensed by the state to provide such treatment, as well as certified by the secretary of corrections to participate in the SB 123 program. 35 While in drug treatment, the offenders will be supervised by the Kansas Community Correctional Services.
36
In addition to traditional duties, when working with an offender sentenced under SB 123, the community correctional officer also "work[s] with the substance abuse treatment staff to ensure effective supervision and monitoring of the offender." 37 The probation officer and treatment providers are required to regularly conduct team meetings to discuss the progress of the offender and whether greater supervision is needed.
38
Treatment lasts for a period not to exceed eighteen months. 39 During treatment, SB 123 attempts to address the continuous needs of each particular offender in two ways. First, courts have the ability to modify the level of treatment in order to meet an offender's needs as they evolve. 40 As the Kansas Supreme Court noted in State v. Preston, the legislature intended the SB 123 program to "match the level of [drug] treatment to the offender's particular substance abuse needs."
41 Such modification, furthermore, is not limited to an initial needs assessment. " [T] o effect the goals of the legislation," as the court noted in Preston, "the S.B. 123 substance abuse treatment program must be amenable to modification or revision to meet the offender's current needs, as those needs change or become more clearly defined." 42 The court noted that the particular defendant at issue, after being sentenced to SB 123 drug treatment, had subsequently demonstrated that she was "unable to handle her addiction problem while on her own."
43 Accordingly, the district court was justified in modifying her SB 123 treatment program by ordering her to attend inpatient treatment. 44 Second, courts have the ability to address current offender needs via sanctions if the offender subsequently violates a condition of his or her treatment program.
45 "Such non-prison sanctions shall include, but not be limited to, up to 60 days in a county jail, fines, community service, intensified treatment, house arrest and electronic monitoring." 46 For example, an offender may be required to perform community service for failing to participate in treatment, spend a short amount of "shock time" in jail for failing to undergo a drug test, or be required to undergo 37 49 The Kansas Supreme Court has held that once a court has found that an offender has committed a new felony or engaged in a pattern of intentional conduct demonstrating refusal to comply, the court is required to revoke SB 123 drug treatment and impose the underlying sentence. The Gumfory court recognized that district courts have broad 47 . See SB 123 OPERATIONS MANUAL, supra note 26, at ch. 4-2 (discussing the ability to sanction SB 123 probationers under the heading "Offender Accountability"). discretion to impose conditions on general probation.
52
The court reasoned that it was unlikely that the legislature would grant a court such broad discretion to impose conditions, only to then limit its ability to revoke an offender's probation because he "violated some terms of his probation rather than others."
53 Furthermore, the grant of such broad discretion, both in the imposition of conditions and ability to revoke, applies to SB 123 probation as well.
54
It is important to note that upon revocation there is a significant difference between SB 123 probation and "standard" probation. Offenders placed on standard probation are statutorily granted a jail-time credit in the event their probation is revoked and they are sentenced to confinement. 55 Standard probationers who spend time in a residential facility, conservation camp, or community correctional residential services program, have the length of their sentences reduced by the amount of time they spent in these facilities. 56 Courts are required to provide this jail-time credit to standard probationers facing revocation.
57
This is not the case for offenders sentenced to SB 123 probation. "The amount of time spent participating . . . shall not be credited as service on the underlying prison sentence." 58 This legislative denial of a jail-time credit to SB 123 probationers (along with the mandatory nature of SB 123) has created two classes of probationers in Kansas. The Kansas Supreme Court has upheld this legislative distinction, ruling that it is not a violation of equal protection. 59 As the court noted, offenders sentenced to SB 123 drug treatment comprise a separate class of probations and are therefore not treated equally by being denied "jail-time" credit when their SB 123 probation is revoked. B. An Overview: Drug Courts
Defining Drug Courts
Having examined SB 123 probationary drug treatment in Kansas, it is important to compare the program to drug courts. A "drug court" is a specialized court within a local court system that is designed to treat individuals addicted to drugs.
61
"The mission of drug courts," as established by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, "is to stop the abuse of alcohol and other drugs and other related criminal activity." 62 A drug court essentially uses "the criminal system to treat drug addiction through judicially monitored treatment rather than incarceration or probation." 63 This combination of probation, drug treatment, and continuous judicial supervision is the distinctive feature of drug courts. A drug court is composed of a team of professionals that includes: a judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, treatment providers, case managers, probation officers, and other law enforcement representatives. 64 This team works with the participant throughout his or her time in drug court and each team member provides unique input regarding the participant's progress. 65 Within this team, the judge is essential. The judge is not only the ultimate decision maker, but also an active participant who directs the process forward. 66 An offender enters drug court through a variety of adjudicatory pathways, for example pre-plea, pre-adjudication, or post-adjudication plea agreement. 67 An offender generally participates in drug court for a general period of twelve to eighteen months and is expected to adhere to an individualized treatment plan, undergo weekly drug tests, and attend regular status hearings in front of the entire drug court team. 68 The judge may impose positive or negative consequences-rewards for good 61 Drug courts also seek individuals charged with offenses "which are determined to have been caused or influenced by their addiction such as theft, burglary, or forgery."
73 Such an offender is considered both "high need" and "high risk." "High need" refers to those disorders or impairments that "if treated, substantially reduce the likelihood of continued engagement in crime." 74 The most common need is usually substance dependence. [or] the same (or closely related) substance is taken to relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms; (3) the substance is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than was intended; (4) there is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control substance use; (5) a great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain the substance . . . use the substance, or recover from its effects; (6) important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced because of substance use; (7) will not succeed on standard supervision and will continue to engage in the same pattern of behavior that got him or her into trouble in the first place." 76 Research has shown that drug courts:
[T]end to have the most powerful effects for drug offenders who are both high risk and high need, meaning that they have serious substance abuse disorders and also have a history of a poor response to standard treatment and/or antisocial personality traits . . . . If a drug court focuses on low-severity offenders, it is less likely to achieve meaningful cost savings for its community that would justify the additional expense and effort of the program. 78 They are as follows:
1. Drug courts integrate alcohol and other drug treatment services with justice system case processing.
2. Using a non-adversarial approach, prosecution and defense counsel promote public safety while protecting participants' due process rights.
3. Eligible participants are identified early and promptly placed in the drug court program.
4. Drug courts provide access to a continuum of alcohol, drug, and other related treatment and rehabilitation services.
5. Abstinence is monitored by frequent alcohol and other drug testing. 87 and these courts are funded by a combination federal, state, and local sources. 88 Every drug court in Missouri is presided over by a judge, who is appointed by the majority of the judges in the circuit (county). 89 Each circuit has discretion to establish its own conditions for drug court referral. 90 That said, most drug courts in Missouri are pre-plea diversionary programs, meaning the offender's charges are dismissed upon successful completion of the program. 91 In Arkansas, the legislature recognized " [t] here is a critical need for judicial intervention and support for effective treatment programs that reduce the incidence of drug use, drug addiction, and family separation due to parental substance abuse and drug-related crime." 92 In light of such a need, the legislature attempted to "enhance public safety by facilitating the creation, expansion, and coordination of drug court programs" across the state. 
III. ANALYSIS

A. Problems with an Overly Narrow Target Population
The purpose of SB 123 is to address the significant problem of recidivism among drug-addicted offenders. 100 The Kansas Supreme Court noted in Preston that the Kansas Sentencing Commission had analogized this particular problem to a "revolving door." 101 The use of this analogy by the commission is an acknowledgment of the fact that substance-dependent offenders in Kansas are continuously in and out of prison as a result of their addictions. Acknowledging this predicament in word, however, is not the same as acknowledging it in action. As described above, SB 123 is extremely limited in scope-primarily in three ways. First, only offenders convicted of possession of a controlled substance are eligible for the program. Second, within this alreadynarrow category of offenders, only first-time and second-time felony possession offenders are eligible.
102 Lastly, the sentence for a third or subsequent felony possession conviction shall be imprisonment.
103
Herein lies the problem with SB 123: the rhetoric behind the law is subverted by its own restrictions.
The effectiveness of SB 123 in breaking the recidivistic cycle of drug-addicted offenders is seriously undermined by limiting eligibility to only those offenders convicted of drug possession at the exclusion of all other criminal offenders. This limitation ignores the large population of other offenders whose criminal acts were driven by drug dependency. It is important to understand that drug-dependent offenders do not practice a restrained criminality. They commit other offenses besides mere possession; and, such offenses are likely spread across the criminal spectrum.
104 After all, serious drug use and negative behavioral patterns 
noting that there is an "intimate relationship between the circuits disrupted by abused drugs and those that underlie self-control," and that a "fundamental motivational shift takes place whereby a drug is no longer taken to derive pleasure from it but to satiate intense craving and to relieve the distress of not having the drug").
105 who are in serious need of substance abuse treatment as well as those included under SB 123.
107
The goal of SB 123 to "address more effectively the revolving door of drug addicts in the state prisons" is further sterilized by limiting eligibility to only those first-time or second-time felony possession offenders. To stop the revolving door of recidivism, the criminal justice system must target persons actually caught up in its swirling vortex. SB 123's eligibility limitations keep the program from reaching the people truly caught up in the justice system, and they ignore the fact that these individuals (because of their addiction) are at much greater risk for having more than one or two felony possession convictions. In its study on the feasibility of drug courts in Kansas, the NCSC noted this problem:
Kansas would see a greater cost benefit if SB 123 programs . . . were available to a broader range of offenders. By accepting only first and second time felony possession offenders for drug possession, the programs are not catching the individuals who are caught in the revolving door of substance abuse and criminal behavior.
108
It can hardly be said that a person facing a first or second felony possession offense is caught up in a cycle of criminal justice appearances. These are the people who, more likely than not, need probationary drug treatment the least. Even more problematic is the fact that when a person is convicted of possession for a third or subsequent time, the presumptive sentence is imprisonment, and the court "shall" sentence the offender to prison.
109 SB 123 exacerbates the very problem it seeks to solve! Rather than pulling offenders out of the revolving door, SB 123 throws them back in.
Providing only a single opportunity at drug treatment further strangles the effectiveness of SB 123. This limitation fails to consider that addicted individuals are likely to relapse multiple times; 110 113 This is not to say that repeat offenders, previously unsuccessful in probationary drug treatment, should be given grace ad nauseam. However, providing only one opportunity at drug treatment ignores the reality of drug addiction and only undermines the goals of SB 123.
Comparing SB 123's Eligibility and Admission Requirements to Drug Court Practice
The eligibility restrictions and limitations of SB 123 are also contrary to drug court practice, which has been proven effective in reducing "recidivism and substance abuse among high-risk substance abusing offenders and increase[ing] their likelihood of successful rehabilitation . . . ." 114 The first key component of drug court provides a broad mission statement: "The mission of drug courts is to stop the abuse of alcohol and other drugs and related criminal activity." 115 The phrase "related criminal activity" necessarily implies any criminal activity related to drug abuse and addiction. This mission statement recognizes that the problem is not a particular brand of crime, but a particular brand of criminal. Importantly, drug courts are not limited to a certain type of offense; they are only limited to a certain type of offender-the offender that is addicted to drugs.
Drug court eligibility is not limited to only those offenders convicted of possession.
116 Drug courts generally target non-violent misdemeanor or felony offenders where drugs were the underlying cause or motivator having a relapse." (emphasis added)).
111. See JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK, supra note 13, at 68-70. (relating the clinical understanding that addiction recovery is a lengthy process, and "[i]f it took months or years to lay down drugrelated pathways, then it could be expected to take months or years to lay down newer pathways that can compete effectively against drug or alcohol abuse").
112 of the crime. 117 The NCSC noted that, "less than one-third of prior convictions in all courts were drug-related; this indicates that [drug court] participants are involved in a wider range of criminal activity."
118
The reasoning behind this broad inclusion of any drug-addicted offender, as explained above, is grounded in extensive research. The NCSC reported further that "[r]esearch shows definitively that drug courts are most effective for high-risk / high-needs offenders. Most high-risk / high-needs individuals have multiple convictions, are highly addictive and have failed at treatment before."
119
Because most dual high-risk and high-need individuals have previously failed drug treatment, many states that have institutionalized drug courts allow judges to determine whether an offender will get more than one chance at drug court treatment. In Missouri, the only conditions imposed upon eligibility of drug-addicted offenders are that the offenders be non-violent and that the referral to drug court be agreed upon by both parties. 120 Similarly, Arkansas denies drug court admission only to individuals previously convicted of sexual or violent offenses.
121
Oklahoma requires that drug-addicted offenders have no violent offenses within the previous ten years, 122 admit to having an addiction to drugs, 123 volunteer for the program, 124 get approval from the prosecuting attorney, and subsequently appear before a judge who determines admission into the drug court program. 125 The point here is not to catalog drug court admission criteria, but rather to show how many states do not deny admission into drug court to those who have previously failed drug treatment. Kansas's one-shot rule denies courts the discretion to determine the best sentence for each offender.
The eligibility and admission provisions of SB 123 not only undermine the aspirations of the law, but are also contrary to effective drug court practice. In light of these problematic eligibility restrictions, SB 123's eligibility scheme should be replaced in the event drug courts 128 Studies have shown that when any one of these team members were regularly absent, participant results were 50% less favorable. 129 Moreover, drug court offenders regularly appear and give progress reports to judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, treatment providers, and other criminal justice personnel. These regular, status hearings have been shown to be a critical aspect of drug court effectiveness.
130 Importantly, such hearings are non-adversarial. 131 To be sure, courts require that participants actually participate in treatment and sanctions are imposed for non-compliance. However, as part of the treatment program, courts also understand that addiction takes time to conquer-participants are going to have issues with compliance and 126. TEN KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 62, at 1. 127. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 128. MARLOWE, supra note 15, at 4; see also TEN KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 62, at 7. 129. MARLOWE, supra note 15, at 4. 130. Id. 131. TEN KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 62, at 3 ("To facilitate an individual's progress in treatment, the prosecutor and defense counsel must shed their traditional adversarial courtroom relationship and work together as a team. Once a defendant is accepted into the drug court program, the team's focus is on the participant's recovery and law-abiding behavior-not on the merits of the pending case.").
relapse. 132 Thus, drug courts combine the "hammer" of the justice system with this therapeutic approach. This approach holds the participant appropriately accountable while, at the same time, providing needed treatment services.
Some aspects of SB 123 are similar to drug court, for example, stateprovided drug treatment, and the ability to impose sanctions. Outside of sanctions and the revocation process, SB 123 lacks judicial involvement in the treatment process. This is extremely significant because judicial involvement is the critical piece of drug court practice. Without continuous judicial supervision, the offender lacks a major external motivation to change. Even though the threat of judicial sanction is present, such sanctions sit outside the treatment process, are not immediately available, and are imposed by a judge not intimately involved with the offender's case.
C. SB 123's Mandatory Admission and Revocation Requirements and the Denial of Jail-Time Credit
As shown above, SB 123 requires that those offenders who meet the eligibility and admission criteria within K.S.A. section 21-6824 must be admitted into the program. 133 Whether the offender desires probationary drug treatment is irrelevant. While in the program, offenders are subject to sanctions if they fail to abide by the terms of their probation or treatment. 134 Offenders are discharged if they commit a new felony. requirements of SB 123, coupled with the law's denial of jail-time credit, are problematic for two reasons. These provisions increase the rate of offender recidivism and generate serious due process concerns.
The Effect of SB 123's Mandatory Admission and Revocation
Requirements on Recidivism SB 123 is counterproductive in that, while it is too narrow, it is also too broad. As mentioned above, the law is too narrow because SB 123 drug treatment is limited to those convicted of felony drug possession for the first or second time. Because admission into SB 123 is mandatory, the law is too broad at the same time. Today, unlike ten years ago, all "high risk" first-or second-time possession offenders are forced into SB 123 probationary drug treatment. 139 Once in the program, offenders face a probation involving greater supervision, more demanding requirements, and more stringent revocation guidelines. The mandatory nature of SB 123 thus becomes problematic.
"Net-widening" is a phenomenon that occurs when a non-prison sentence such as probation actually increases, rather than decreases, prison sentences.
140
Net-widening can occur anytime a jurisdiction places more offenders into probation programs with increased requirements and additional supervision.
141
The more jurisdictions monitor and restrict probationers, the more likely it is that violations will be discovered. 141. See id. at 52 (noting that, despite the positive misconception that probation decreases prison sentences, research on probation has historically found that probation "expand[s] the 'net' of formal social control").
[ revoke probation and impose underlying prison sentences more often.
143
Considering the general qualities of the typical possession offender in light of the increased probationary standards of SB 123, it becomes clear that net-widening will likely occur as the rate of violations and revocations increase. 144 The reason is simple. Drug possession offenders are more likely to have problems with substance abuse and addiction than other offenders. Obviously, because such offenders are at a greater risk of using illicit drugs, they are at high risk of violating the terms of their probation. The possession offenders placed in SB 123, therefore, are at a greater risk of being revoked, especially because revocation is mandatory for certain offenses.
This has already proven to be the case for SB 123. In 2012, an extensive study by Don Stemen and Andres Rengifo of the National Institute of Justice examined the effectiveness of SB 123. 145 The study acknowledged the net-widening effect of SB 123's mandatory admission requirements and provided this damning conclusion: Therefore, rather than decrease the rates of recidivism and the subsequent imposition of prison sentences, SB 123 actually increases the likelihood that a possession offender will reoffend and be sent to prison.
Due Process Concerns Regarding the Denial of a Jail-Time Credit
Apart from the concern regarding SB 123 probationer success rates, mandatory admission into SB 123 probation is disconcerting for another 143. Id. (noting that there is no reason to believe offenders in intensive supervision programs commit more violations; the reason for higher rates of violations and subsequent revocations is that offenders are more closely monitored, which increases the chance that violations will be discovered).
144. See SB 123 EVALUATION, supra note 106, at 205 ("[M]ore drug possessors are now subject to stricter conditions and greater surveillance than prior to implementation of SB 123; a situation that may be leading to higher rates of revocation.").
145. Id. at 4-5. 146. Id. at 206.
reason. Offenders placed in SB 123 will not be given a jail-time credit in the event their probation is revoked. As mentioned above, the right to jail-time credit is statutory for "standard" probationers in Kansas. 147 In the event an offender's probation is revoked, the court must reduce the offender's prison sentence by the amount of time spent in confinement during his or her probation.
148 SB 123 probationers, however, do not receive the same treatment.
In creating this separate class of probationers, the Kansas Legislature decided that time spent in an SB 123 program will not count towards the underlying prison sentence.
149
This distinction between standard probationers and SB 123 probationers creates constitutional concerns involving offenders' due process rights.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteen Amendment 150 requires that each state afford procedural protections before the government may deprive an individual of a "life," "liberty," or "property" interest. 151 The basic due process question is: when the government deprives an individual of a life, liberty, or property interest, what process is due?
152
This question allows for a flexible response-it requires procedural protections as each particular situation demands. 153 The Kansas Supreme Court put it this way: "The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. . . . A due process violation exists only when a claimant is able to establish that he or she was denied a specific procedural protection to which he or she was entitled." 154 An individual charged with a crime has an obvious liberty interest at stake when facing potential incarceration and is entitled to due process protections. Such protections include notice and an opportunity to be heard at a fair and adequate trial. 155 Due process protections, however, do not end at trial. Criminal defendants are also entitled to due process at sentencing. According to the Supreme Court, "it is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause." 156 Further, at sentencing, "free-standing due process constitutes the almost exclusive source of constitutionally mandated procedural rights."
157
According to one scholar's summary:
Due process governs the range of conduct and type of information that may be considered by the sentencing judge, the need for notifying the defendant of the information that the judge will consider in making the sentencing decision, the need to ensure that information relied upon is accurate, and the need to provide the defendant with an opportunity to be heard and to offer his own evidence. 158 Indeed, due process today:
[R]ecognizes that adversary procedural rights are needed at [sentencing] , just as at the criminal trial, because the length and terms of the sentence implicate the defendant's liberty interest no less than conviction itself. The judge's determination of the length of the sentence, or her choice between a prison term, home confinement, or probation, may affect the defendant's interests as keenly as the fact of conviction.
159
Because of judicial discretion in sentencing and the liberty interest at stake, criminal defendants have the right to be heard in a meaningful way at sentencing, and are therefore provided due process rights at the sentencing stage. The mandatory admission requirement of SB 123 effectively eliminates an offender's opportunity to be heard at sentencing by eliminating the judge's discretion to sentence. As noted above, the statute requires courts to sentence first-and second-time felony possession offenders to drug treatment. 160 When the judge has no choice but to sentence a possession offender to SB 123 treatment, the offender has no voice in the matter. Whether an offender is adamantly opposed to drug treatment, desires standard probation, or wishes to serve the underlying prison sentence is of no consequence. SB 123 probationary drug treatment is mandatory. The possession-offender eligible for SB 123, therefore, has no opportunity to be heard at sentencing.
Does the denial of an offender's right to be heard at sentencing through the imposition of a mandatory sentence constitute a denial of due process? The answer at first appears to be "no." Due process attacks against mandatory sentences have been made numerous times in the past, and such attacks have often focused on mandatory impositions of minimum prison sentences following a repeated or aggravated offense. 161 Offenders attack mandatory prison sentences with the argument that they denied the judge discretion to suspend or reduce the sentence, and (as the argument goes) thus deprived the offender due process at sentencing.
162
This argument has generally lost as courts have consistently held that mandatory sentences are constitutionally valid and do not violate defendants' due process rights. 163 The driving justification behind such approval arises out of the legislature's power to define punishment for specific crimes. 164 After all:
The power of the legislature to fix the punishment for crime is practically unlimited; it may take property, it may take liberty, it may take life, in punishment for an infraction of the law, so long as it does not in so doing infringe or violate any of the guaranties secured to all citizens by the Constitution. 165 Indeed, the Kansas Supreme Court has noted that "fixing and prescribing of penalties for violating the criminal statutes of this state is a legislative function."
166
It is important to note, however, that mandatory sentences today are not fixed, one-size-fits-all sentences in which a judge has absolutely no discretion-that is, they are not truly mandatory. Rather, "mandatory sentence" generally refers to a sentence that falls within a legislatively provided minimum and maximum sentencing range to which the judge must abide. 167 Such sentencing provisions merely reduce the amount of discretion a judge may utilize at sentencing. 168 Though truly mandatory fixed sentences were a part of our nation's early history, "[m]odern mandatory sentence enhancement legislation differs from the fixed sentences imposed [historically] . Most of the current laws do not set the penalties for criminal offenses themselves, but instead require substantially increased punishment when a specified aggravating circumstance exists in connection with the commission of a crime." 168. In Kansas there are two sentencing guideline "grids" that judges use during sentencing. One grid covers nondrug crimes (K.S.A. § 21-6804) while the other grid covers drug crimes (K.S.A. § 21-6805). Though there are differences, both grids function the same. To use the nondrug grid as an example: "The sentencing guidelines grid for nondrug crimes as provided in this section defines presumptive punishments for felony convictions, subject to the sentencing court's discretion to enter a departure sentence." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6804(d) (West 2013) (emphasis added). Furthermore, "The sentencing court has discretion to sentence at any place within the sentencing range. In the usual case it is recommended that the sentencing judge select the center of the range and reserve the upper and lower limits for aggravating and mitigating factors insufficient to warrant a departure." Id. § 21-6804(e)(1) (emphasis added).
169. Lowenthal, supra note 167, at 69. A wide variety of circumstances trigger enhanced penalties under the statutes. Most
Though mandatory admission to SB 123 drug treatment does not appear constitutionally problematic at first, SB 123 generates due process concerns distinguishable from those commonly raised against mandatory prison sentences. Unlike most "mandatory" sentences, the imposition of SB 123 probation is truly mandatory for eligible offenders. With most mandatory prison sentences, the sentencing judge utilizes discretion between the mandatory minimum and maximum possible sentences. Even though discretion is limited, it is not completely eliminated. SB 123, on the other hand, imposes a truly fixed sentence. According to the statute, once a first or second felony possession has been deemed eligible, the judge has no discretion.
The biggest difference between the mandatory prison sentences mentioned above and SB 123 is that SB 123 statutorily requires probationary drug treatment. This becomes constitutionally significant because of several factors. First, there is a greater likelihood that possession offenders placed in SB 123 drug treatment will be drugdependent offenders. Second, offenders face increased supervision while in SB 123 drug treatment. Third, SB 123 probationers face potential sanctions that deprive them of liberty; 170 and, any sanction involving confinement will not count as a jail-time credit against the underlying sentence for offenders removed from SB 123 probation. 171 When one considers these factors, especially the nature of the SB 123 probationers themselves, denying offenders a voice at sentencing becomes problematic. Such a denial is problematic because offenders face a deprivation of liberty that goes beyond fair punishment.
As mentioned above, addicted individuals will likely relapse multiple times, and, consequently, repeatedly violate their probation.
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As a consequence of these violations, a drug-addicted offender forced into SB 123 could be sanctioned with house arrest, long-term inpatient drug treatment, and even 60 days in the county jail for failing to stay clean, jurisdictions have adopted provisions requiring substantially longer prison sentences when a person possesses or uses a dangerous weapon during the commission of an offense. Enhanced sentences for repeat felony offenders are also common. Other common targets of enhancement legislation are persons who possess or distribute prohibited drugs exceeding a specified weight or amount, those who commit crimes against vulnerable victims such as children or elderly persons, and those who commit crimes while released from custody for other offenses. 173 If, at any time following a violation, an offender "fails to participate in or has a pattern of intentional conduct that demonstrates the [offender's] refusal to comply with or participate in the treatment program," then the offender could be removed from SB 123 and their underlying sentence imposed without credit for time already spent in confinement.
174 Drugaddicted offenders are also at a much greater risk for picking up additional felonies. 175 Likewise, if an individual is addicted to drugs, there is a greater likelihood that they will be caught possessing drugs, and in this instance, revocation is mandatory.
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In a remarkably detailed section regarding addiction and treatment, the Drug Court Judicial Benchbook (developed by the National Drug Court Institute) noted this low likelihood of success for drug offenders sentenced to drug treatment as a condition of their probation:
Unfortunately, drug offenders are notorious for failing to comply with their conditions to attend substance abuse treatment. Unless they are intensively supervised by the court, approximately twenty-five percent of drug offenders who have been ordered to attend substance abuse treatment will fail to enroll in treatment; and, among those who do arrive for treatment, approximately one-half will drop out of treatment prematurely. SB 123's sanctioning provisions, the statute's suspension of jail-time credit, and the characteristics of offenders placed into the SB 123 program create this overarching problem: SB 123 probationers face a substantial risk of being overly punished, with a substantial possibility that offenders will serve more time in confinement than is warranted by the underlying prison sentence for drug possession. 179 When an offender could very likely face more time in confinement than the underlying prison sentence, then denying that offender a chance to be heard at sentencing is of serious concern. By mandating that an eligible first-time or second-time felony possession offender be sentenced to SB 123 probation, regardless of his or her inappropriateness for treatment, the legislature effectively sets the offender up for a protracted course of sanction and eventual revocation. This results in an unfair amount of punishment. This is a denial of due process.
To be sure, the imposition of standard probation may rightfully be considered a legislative "grace" given to the offender. 180 Kansas Courts have repeatedly stated that "probation from service of a prison sentence is an act of grace by the sentencing judge and . . . is granted as a privilege, not as a matter of right." 181 However, when another "type" of probation, involving greater requirements and an increased amount of supervision, is forced on a group of individuals facing a great risk of failure, it can hardly be considered grace any longer. It is not enough to say that, since the legislature decreed it, it is therefore decided. The procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment impose constraints on the government when potentially depriving individuals of liberty.
182 A major liberty interest is implicated when an offender could serve more time in confinement than the punishment presumes. Though the legislature has provided sentencing guidelines for criminal acts 183 offenses 184 -it has not long been in the business of completely removing a judge's discretion at sentencing, and in turn the offender's voice, by mandating probationary drug treatment. 185 Aside from the fact that the mandatory imposition of probationary drug treatment is bad public policy, in light of the above concerns, it also constitutes a denial of due process.
Standard Probationers v. SB 123 Probationers: Questions Involving
Equal Protection.
The distinction between standard probationers and SB 123 probationers inevitably brings up the question of equal protection. The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution states: "No state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws." 186 The guiding principle of equal protection is that similarly situated individuals should be treated alike. 187 Both the United States and Kansas Supreme Courts employ one of three tests to determine whether a legal classification violates equal protection: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis review. 188 Which test is used depends on the type of the classification and the rights that are effected by that classification. 189 legislative classification targets a suspect class or burdens a fundamental right. 190 Mental illness or mental disability are not considered a suspect class, and will only be subject to rational basis review. 191 Moreover, the rational basis test is two-fold: (1) the classification within the law must implicate a legitimate goal, and (2) the means chosen by the legislature to effectuate that goal must be rationally related. 192 Rational basis review is a deferential standard, and courts will rarely strike down a classification under this test. 193 So deferential is rational basis review that courts will uphold a law, even in the absence of legislative justification, if they themselves could conjure any rational basis for the classification. 194 With this understanding of the basic tenets of equal protection, SB 123's denial of jail-time credit becomes immediately concerning. After all, is it not the case that offenders placed into SB 123 probation are being denied a right that is statutorily granted to all probationers? Does SB 123's denial of a statutorily granted jail-time credit not, therefore, constitute a violation of equal protection? The answer is "no." To start, drug addiction, as a recognized mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association, 195 is not a suspect classification-any classification, therefore, regarding drug addicts will be subject only to rational basis review. 196 Further, a court could conjure rational reasons for why the Kansas Legislature decided to treat offenders forced into SB 123 drug treatment differently by denying them a jail-time credit. For example, the legislature may have viewed such coercive treatment as a way to forcefully counter addiction. They may have considered the denial of jail-time credit as a means to coerce offender compliance with probationary drug treatment. Thus, the legislature could have had a rational basis for treating SB 123 probationers differently from ordinary probationers. When subject to such light scrutiny, there is no equal protection violation.
There is a more basic reason, though, for why an equal protection argument against SB 123 is bound to fail on legal grounds. In response to an SB 123 probationer's attack against on the law's denial of a jailtime credit, the Kansas Supreme Court noted in Preston that: Preston's holding, though resting on a relatively solid legal foundation, is nonetheless artificial when you consider that SB 123 probationers and standard probationers are not significantly different. By limiting admission to only those convicted of possession, SB 123 carries the incorrect assumption that these are the only offenders with drug problems. If this assumption were true, then there would indeed be a significant difference in circumstances between the two types of probationers. This assumption, however, is not true. above, drug addiction leads to all types of crimes. 199 Offenders of all types suffer from addiction, and are likewise in need of serious substance abuse treatment. 200 To say that possession offenders placed in SB 123 probation are categorically different from other probationers is therefore inaccurate.
Further, assuming that both sets of probationers comprise a single class, it is important to consider the rationality of mandating SB 123 probation and denying a jail-time credit to those who fail the program. Just because the legislature's classifications pass constitutional muster does not mean that they achieve the legislature's goals. First, if the goal of SB 123 is to "provide community punishment and the opportunity for treatment to nonviolent offenders with drug abuse problems in order to more effectively address the revolving door of drug addicts through the state prison," 201 then, aside from limiting admission to only possession offenders, mandating drug treatment undercuts the goal of SB 123. Mandatory admission may actually serve as a hindrance by increasing rates of recidivism and subsequent revocation. 202 Mandatory admission requirements "dismiss[] the significance of the individual's readiness [to] engage[] with treatment." 203 Moreover, "[a]s criminal justice stakeholders noted and offenders confirmed, the ultimate success of treatment depends on the individual . . . SB 123 does not provide a clear mechanism for translating compulsory compliance with treatment through supervision and sanctions into internalized motivation." 204 The denial of a jail-time credit-assuming this provision was intended to act as the "stick" to ensure offender compliance-presupposes a rational mind that will appropriately weigh the pros and cons of continued drug use in light of criminal punishment. The problem when dealing with those addicted to drugs, however, is that rational thought is severely compromised. 205 To assume that drug-addicted offenders placed into SB 123 probation will refrain from drugs because they will not receive jailtime credit after revocation ignores the power of addiction. It cannot be said that mandatory admission and the denial of a jail-time credit furthers the underlying goals and objectives of SB 123.
IV. CONCLUSION
Drug-addicted offenders pose a unique challenge to the criminal justice system-a challenge that requires an approach that is both bold and smart. Traditional sanctions are incapable of surmounting the problem of illicit drug abuse and addiction. In recent years, courts across the country have developed innovative and educated methods to better deal with this intractable problem. Through these efforts, drug courts have emerged as a proven way to check drug use and permanently remove drug-addicted individuals from the "revolving door" of criminal justice appearances.
Though SB 123 is a good-intentioned law that takes steps in the right direction, it has major deficiencies that severely undermine its goals and objectives. Apart from the law's serious constitutional concerns, it is simply bad public policy. SB 123 lacks the key ingredients responsible for drug court success-primarily, continuous judicial supervision. SB 123 is inflexibly limited to only a narrow class of drug offenders, which incorrectly assumes that only those caught in possession of drugs are in need of treatment. More importantly, SB 123 has stringent admission and termination requirements that ignore the nature of drug addictionexacerbating the very problem the program seeks to address. It is a waste of money and much needed resources to continue to sink money into such a program. Rather than continue with a half-hearted program, SB 123 should be replaced through the institutionalization of drug courts in Kansas. Having already proven their effectiveness, drug courts provide a better way.
